

CIL
EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

12/24/91 SUPERSEDES 08/31/90

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NAME P/N QTY	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
CRIT			
PREKADING (SOP), ITEM 200 ----- 6Y799045-80 (1)	200FM01: External gas leakage, SOP/PLSS interface connector.	END ITEM: Sust gas leakage to ambient. BFE INTERFACE: Leakage of primary oxygen supply to ambient. Premature depletion of primary oxygen supply.	A. Design - The static seals at either end of this connector are radial “O” seals, fabricated of silicone. This “O” ring seal design configuration dimensions and rigidity of assembly provide squeeze under all loading conditions for this item. B. Test - Certification Test - The item completed the 15 year structural vibration and shock certification requirement during 10/83. EC 42886-619 (dimensional) has been incorporated and certified since that time.
		MISGATION: Terminate EVA.	C. Inspection - All details, gages and test facilities are cleaned and inspected to 49335B EHSOA to preclude contamination. Details, including the O-Rings, O-Ring grooves, and sealing surfaces are 100% Inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish characteristics. Details are manufactured from material with certified physical and chemical properties.
			D. Failure History - none.
			E. Ground Turnaround - Tested per EOU-R-001, preflight gas structural and leakage.
			F. Operational Use - Crew response - EVA: Since EVA termination is required as soon as cap is floating, crew would abort EVA when excessive SOP rate is detected. Training - Standard EOU training covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EOU. Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EOU pressure integrity and regulation. Flight rules define EOU as lost for loss of operational SOP. Real Time Data System allows ground

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NAME	FAILURE	ANALYST:
P/N	MODE &	
OFF	CAUSES	
CRIT	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
2/1B	200FHOLE	Monitoring of EMU systems.

SPMU-44-001H
Rev. 1219

EMU - 1244